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I. Introduction 
In spite of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ford v. 
Wainwright,1 Atkins v. Virginia,2 Panetti v. Quarterman,3 and 
Hall v. Florida,4 persons with severe psychosocial and intellectual 
disabilities continue to be given death sentences, in some cases 
leading to actual execution.5 Although the courts have been aware 
                                                                                                     
 1. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 2. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 3. 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
 4. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 5. Before Atkins, at least thirty-five mentally retarded defendants were 
executed in the years after the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL RETARDATION 2 (2001) (explaining that the exact number of mentally 
retarded individuals on death row has not been quantified, but it may be as high 
as 300). On the “back stories” of several cases in Texas in which individuals with 
intellectual disabilities have been executed since the decision in Atkins, see Lane 
Florsheim, How Texas Keeps Putting the Intellectually Disabled on Death Row, 
NEW REPUBLIC (May 14, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117765/ death-
penalty-mentally-disabled-how-do-states-keep-doing-it (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) 
(describing how mentally disabled individuals such as Marvin Wilson, a murderer 
with an IQ of sixty-one, are executed based on faulty science that the state uses 
to determine mental competency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). See also Lincoln Caplan, Last Chance for Warren Lee Hill, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 19, 2013), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/last-chance-for-
warren-lee-hill/?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (relaying the story of a mentally 
retarded individual in Georgia who was sentenced to death under circumstances 
“MERCHANTS AND THIEVES, HUNGRY FOR POWER” 1503 
of this for decades—dating back at least to the infamous Ricky 
Rector case in Arkansas6—these base miscarriages of justice 
continue and show no sign of abating. Scholars have written 
clearly and pointedly on this issue (certainly, more frequently since 
the Atkins decision in 2002),7 but little has changed. And the 
stakes in this should be clear to all: “In some form or fashion, 
evidence of mental state is pertinent to virtually every capital 
case.”8 
This is not a surprise to anyone in the criminal justice system, 
as the treatment of persons with mental disabilities has long been 
a scandal. When I titled a recent book, Mental Disability and the 
Death Penalty: The Shame of the States,9 I did so consciously, 
because we should all be profoundly ashamed of a system that 
shames persons with disabilities as well as those who advocate for 
them. As I stated in that book, there is no question that this cohort 
of defendants “receive substandard counsel, are treated poorly in 
prison, receive disparately longer sentences, and are regularly 
coerced into confessing to crimes (many of which they did not 
commit).”10 What may be most scandalous of all is that we know 
                                                                                                     
similar to Marvin Wilson and Robert Ladd) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Kira Lerner, Texas is About to Execute an Intellectually Disabled 
Man, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/01/29/ 
3616830/robert-ladd-execution/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (reporting on the case 
of Robert Ladd, a murderer with the IQ of sixty-seven to whom Texas just denied 
a stay of execution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 6. See Death for the Mentally Disabled, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21598681-can-you-execute-man-
whose-iq-71-death-mentally-disabled (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing how 
the defendant, going off to his execution, left behind his last-meal dessert, a piece 
of pecan pie, to have “later”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with 
Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003) [hereinafter What Atkins Could Mean] 
(writing about potential changes to death penalty law now that Atkins outlawed 
the execution of mentally retarded individuals). 
 8. Clive A. Stafford Smith & Rémy Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending 
that Death Row Inmates Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Post-
Conviction Proceedings, 45 LOY. L. REV. 55, 91 (1999). 
 9. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE 
SHAME OF THE STATES (2013) [hereinafter MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY]. 
 10. Id. at 45. 
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that this is “a scandal of little interest to most lawyers, most 
citizens, and most judges.”11  
As time passes within this “scandal” framework, several 
snapshots emerge.12 Perhaps the most important one is the corrupt 
stench of prosecutorial misconduct that aids and abets this 
scandalous shame with absolutely no consequences to the lawyers 
involved (other than, in some cases, promotions and re-elections by 
wider margins than previously).13 There can no longer be any 
question—if there ever was—that this misconduct is “a leading 
cause of wrongful convictions.”14 This prosecutorial misconduct, of 
course, does not stand alone, for it could not. It is aided and abetted 
by the courts, sometimes via explicit judicial bias (examples of 
racial bias by judges such as the infamous Edith Jones are well 
                                                                                                     
 11. Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving Life to 
Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315, 315 (2003) [hereinafter Life Is in Mirrors]. 
 12. For a sampling of recent press stories about this issue, see Susan Greene, 
Court Finds Government Misconduct Tainted Colorado Death Penalty Case, COLO. 
INDEP. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.coloradoindependent.com/ 
145028/government-misconduct-found-in-david-bueno-death-penalty-case (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dahlia 
Lithwick, You’re All Out, SLATE (May 28, 2015), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/orange_county_prosecutor_mis
conduct_judge_goethals_takes_district_attorney.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sarah Rumpf, Texas Bar 
Alleges Prosecutorial Misconduct in Case of Man Executed in 2004, BREITBART 
(Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015/03/20/texas-bar-alleges-
prosecutorial-misconduct-in-case-of-man-executed-in-2004/ (last visited Sept. 8, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. Prosecutorial misconduct amounts to a constitutional violation if it “so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that “the Darden standard is a very general one.” Parker 
v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012). However, the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012), 
“recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable 
manner.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). See also infra notes 
141–146 and accompanying text (discussing Panetti). I have discussed aspects of 
this before in Michael L. Perlin, “Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed”: 
Mental Disability, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Death Penalty, 43 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 266 (2015) [hereinafter Power and Greed and the 
Corruptible Seed]. 
 14. Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, The Self-Training Prosecutor, and 
Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 
727–28 (2011) [hereinafter The Lone Miscreant]. 
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known15) but more often by what I call passive judicial complicity.16 
By way of example, an Arizona reporter found that “even when 
they do make findings of prosecutorial misconduct, judges often do 
not report the offenders to the Bar for investigation and potential 
disciplinary hearings.”17 In his song Hurricane, Bob Dylan 
                                                                                                     
 15. See, e.g., Anna Arceneaux, Montez Spradley, an Innocent Man Once on 
Death Row, Is Free, ACLU (Sept. 10, 2015, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/montez-spradley-innocent-man-once-death-
row-free (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (explaining how the jury voted to sentence 
Montez Spradley to life in prison, but the judge used a judicial override to 
sentence him to death) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brandi 
Grissom, Complaint: Judge’s Death Penalty Remarks Show Racial Bias, TEX. 
TRIB. (June 4, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/06/04/complaint-judges-
comments-show-bias-death-penalty/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (reporting how 
Judge Jones told law students that “racial groups like African-Americans and 
Hispanics are predisposed to crime”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). For an astonishing story of how a judge in a death penalty case 
exchanged hundreds of texts with the district attorney who was prosecuting the 
defendant, see Gardiner & Scheinberg, NAT’L COUNCIL OF CERTIFIED DEMENTIA 
PRACS., https://cases.nationalcdp.org/gardiner-scheinberg/ (last visited Sept. 8, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. To the best of my knowledge, this phrase—“passive judicial complicity”—
does not appear in the legal literature in this context. There is significant 
commentary on judicial complicity in the sanctioning of Jim Crow segregation. 
See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, 
Brown, and a Theory Of Racial Redemption, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 73, 135–
36 (1998) (explaining the various legal doctrines cited by the Supreme Court in 
refusing to protect civil rights during the years of the Warren Court). See 
generally Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1005–08 (1968) 
(reviewing RICHARD HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS 
TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856)). On domestic 
violence, see Zanita E. Fenton, Mirrored Silence: Reflections on Judicial 
Complicity in Private Violence, 78 OR. L. REV. 995 (1999). On judicial complicity 
in improper convictions generally, see Hans Sherrer, The Complicity of Judges in 
the Generation of Wrongful Convictions, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 539 (2003). The phrase 
“passive complicity” is used mostly in the context of affirmative action law, see, 
e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, Life after Adarand: What Happened to the Metro 
Broadcasting Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Telecommunications 
Ownership?, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 87, 107 (1999–2000) (noting that the 
discrimination plaintiffs need to show in such cases “could either be by the 
governmental actor or by its ‘passive complicity’ in the discrimination of others”), 
but the first use appears to be as it relates to the failure of the free world to 
respond to the mass murder of Jews during World War II. Victoria Barnett. See 
generally Provocative Reconciliation, 117 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 942 (2001). 
 17. Michael Kiefer, When Prosecutors Get Too Close to the Line, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.nimodopress.com/blog/2014/4/21/4dwgoz 
41k0vp18u7808bb61jz6yv61 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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castigated the Passaic County press for its complicity in the case 
of the falsely-convicted Ruben “Hurricane” Carter, singing “Bello 
and Bradley and they both baldly lied/And the newspapers, they 
all went along for the ride.”18 Here I argue that it is the judiciary 
that regularly “goes along for the ride.”  
In this Article I seek to answer why persons with mental 
disabilities are so often improperly brought to trial and convicted 
in death penalty cases. In answering this question, I focus on 
ongoing prosecutorial misconduct, sometimes aided and abetted by 
judicial bias and judicial complicity.19 Here, I assess why we blind 
                                                                                                     
 18. Bob Dylan & Jacques Levy, Hurricane, BOB DYLAN, 
http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/hurricane (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). I discuss the implications of this song 
for the teaching of criminal law and procedure in Michael L. Perlin, Tangled up 
in Law: The Jurisprudence of Bob Dylan, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1404–07 
(2011).  
Carter was convicted and his conviction was affirmed. See State v. Carter, 255 
A.2d 746, 753–55 (N.J. 1969) (affirming Carter’s conviction despite numerous 
evidentiary issues and prosecutorial missteps). He moved for a new trial based 
upon the State’s failure to disclose evidence and the testimonial recantation by 
the star witnesses against him, but his motions were denied. State v. Carter, 347 
A.2d 383, 388 (Passaic County Ct. 1975) (ruling that constitutional due process 
concerns are satisfied if the defendant had “the benefit and guidance of a 
competent attorney,” even if there were errors during the trial, because even “the 
best of counsel makes mistakes”); State v. Carter, 345 A.2d 808, 829 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1974) (stating that the withheld evidence tape did not necessarily 
constitute exculpatory evidence, so a new trial was not mandated). The New 
Jersey Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s decision based on the failure to 
disclose key evidence. See State v. Carter, 354 A.2d 627, 635 (N.J. 1976) (ordering 
a new trial on the basis that the withheld October 11 tape had the capacity to 
affect the jury’s decision and substantially prejudice Carter’s trial). Carter was 
again convicted, and that conviction was upheld by the state Supreme Court by a 
4–3 vote. State v. Carter, 449 A.2d 1280, 1284 (N.J. 1982) (affirming the 
conviction despite a strongly worded dissent that referred to the case as 
presenting unparalleled Brady violations). Ultimately, his application for a writ 
of habeas corpus was granted—the court found that his conviction was 
“predicated upon an appeal to racism rather than reason, and concealment rather 
than disclosure.” Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D.N.J. 1985). 
 19. There are other factors as well: 
• Explicit juror bias, what I call sanism, in individual cases. See, e.g., 
Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: 
The Puzzling Role of Mitigating Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE 
DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 239, 257 (1994) [hereinafter Sanist 
Lives] (describing sanism as “an irrational prejudice of the same quality 
and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are 
reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia 
and ethnic bigotry”); see also infra note 137 (defining sanism further). 
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ourselves to these realities, and how they make it utterly 
impossible for the death penalty to ever be administered in a “fair” 
way, especially in cases involving defendants with mental 
disabilities. I will also examine these issues through the lens of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and will conclude that our current 
system utterly rejects the bedrock principles of that school of 
jurisprudence—voice, validation, and voluntariness—in ways that 
contribute to true mockeries of justice. It is noteworthy that this 
analysis could not be done without recognition of the pervasive 
problem of ineffective assistance of counsel in the cases of which I 
speak. 
                                                                                                     
• The consistently pretextual positions of four current Supreme Court 
judges in all matters dealing with the overlap between mental 
disability and criminal behavior, culminating in Justice Alito’s bizarre 
dissent in Hall. On pretextuality in the way that judges deal with cases 
involving defendants with mental disabilities, see Michael L. Perlin, 
Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 625, 639 (1993); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR 
DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY (2013). 
See infra note 137 (defining pretextuality); infra text accompanying 
note 179 (discussing “therapeutic jurisprudence” in the context of 
pretextuality). 
• The lack of availability of trained counsel—from the very first stages of 
the lawyer-client relationship—that can accurately identify mental 
disability, and then (a) strategically plan mental disability-based 
defenses and/or mitigation strategies, and (b) engage appropriate 
experts to assist in trial preparation and trial. See MENTAL DISABILITY 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 57–58 (expounding on the 
problem magnified by Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1976), in 
which the Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional right to 
collateral review or to the assistance of counsel in collateral 
proceedings). 
• The lower courts’ penurious interpretations of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
68 (1985) (right of indigent defendant to independent psychiatrist to aid 
in presentation of insanity defense), in cases involving defendants with 
intellectual disabilities or severe neurological disorders, making the 
proceedings in these cases—in which it is virtually impossible for these 
defendants (post-Giarratano) to even comprehend the substantive law 
or the process in the expedited time procedures that are increasingly 
imposed—an utter sham. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Expediting Death: 
Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in 
Capital Cases, 59 UMKC L. REV. 55 n.99 (1990) (stating that an 
“indigent defendant is entitled to state-provided access to a psychiatrist 
at both guilt and sentencing phases of capital trial”). I will address 
these issues in a subsequent article.  
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My title comes, in part, from the second verse of Bob Dylan’s 
brilliant song, Changing of the Guards: “Fortune calls/I stepped 
forth from the shadows, to the marketplace/Merchants and 
thieves, hungry for power, my last deal gone down.”20 The song, 
per the great Dylanologist Oliver Trager, is about “control of a 
world ruled by power and death,”21 and I think that is just about 
right. There is no question that the criminal trial process is a 
“marketplace” (consider the new academic attention paid to the 
question of the “due process of plea bargaining”), and that death 
penalty trials result when one’s “last deal” was not able to have 
“gone down.” But, to the point, I believe that the prosecutoriate—
“hungry for power”—serve all too often as both “merchants and 
thieves” in this process. I hope that this Article sheds some light 
on this loathsome state of affairs.  
II. Mental Disability, the Death Penalty and Prosecutorial 
Misconduct22 
There is no question that the death penalty is 
disproportionately imposed in cases involving defendants with 
mental disabilities (referring both to those with mental illness and 
with intellectual disabilities, more commonly referred to as mental 
retardation).23 In the words of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judge Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr.: “The greatest threat to justice 
and the Rule of Law in death penalty cases is state prosecutorial 
malfeasance—an old, widespread, and persistent habit.”24 
Persons with mental disabilities are significantly over-
represented at every level of the criminal justice system.25 
                                                                                                     
 20. Bob Dylan, Changing of the Guards, BOB DYLAN, http://www.bobdylan. 
com/us/songs/changing-guards (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 104 (2004). 
 22. Portions of the following section are adapted from Power and Greed and 
the Corruptible Seed, supra note 13. 
 23. Id. at 266–67. 
 24. Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr., Symposium, Prosecutorial Error in Death 
Penalty Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2009). 
 25. Edward A. Polloway et al., Special Challenges for Persons with 
Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System: Introduction to the Special Issue, 19 
“MERCHANTS AND THIEVES, HUNGRY FOR POWER” 1509 
Estimates of those with intellectual disability range from 10–30%, 
and of those with mental illness from 10–70%.26 These wide ranges 
reveal another truth, which is that our databases about these 
populations are deeply flawed.27 
Mental disability confounds all stages of the criminal justice 
system: from pre-contact to initial contact to intake and 
interrogation, to prosecution and disposition, and to 
incarceration.28 In the context of capital punishment, these 
coalesce most vividly in the context of the false confessions.29 While 
there are many reasons why persons with mental disabilities are 
sentenced to death for murders that they did not commit, and other 
reasons why they are sentenced to death in cases where 
individuals without mental disabilities might have been spared the 
death penalty,30 the most prevalent issue is that of false 
confessions. Of the first 130 exonerations that the New York-based 
Innocence Project obtained via DNA evidence, 85 involved people 
convicted after false confessions.31  
                                                                                                     
EXCEPTIONALITY 211, 212 (2011).  
 26. See Julie D. Cantor, Of Pills and Needles: Involuntarily Medicating the 
Psychotic Inmate When Execution Looms, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 119, 136 (2005) 
(providing anecdotes about how inmates on death row can descend into psychosis 
as they linger away in prison). 
 27. For one rigorous study, see Henry Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious 
Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 761, 764 (2009) 
(reporting that a jail study revealed that the rate of current serious mental illness 
for male inmates was 14.5% and for female inmates it was 31%). More recent 
estimates calculate 40% of Rikers Island inmates have some sort of mental illness. 
See Bandy X. Lee & Maya Prabhu, A Reflection on the Madness in Prisons, 26 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 254 (2015) (noting how the rising levels of inmates 
with mental illness at Rikers Island are providing increasingly difficult 
challenges for prison officials).  
 28. Polloway et al., supra note 25, at 214–17. 
 29. See, e.g., Richard Leo & Richard Ofshe, The Consequences of False 
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of 
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (reporting 
the stories of Jack Carmen, David Vasquez, Johnny Lee Wilson, and other 
individuals who were sentenced to death after a false confession).  
 30. For an overview of these cases, see the Death Penalty Information 
Center’s articles on mental illness and the death penalty. Mental Illness, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/mental-illness-and-death-
penalty (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 31. Tracey Maclin, A Criminal Procedure Regime Based on Instrumental 
Values, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 230 n.68 (2005). 
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Mental disability is a commonly recognized risk factor for false 
confessions. Valid and reliable evidence has taught us that false 
confessors have been found to score higher on measures of anxiety, 
depression, anger, extraversion, and psychoticism as well as being 
more likely to have seen a mental health professional or taken 
psychiatric medications in the year prior.32 One of the leading 
articles on this phenomenon notes that “an inability to distinguish 
fact from fantasy due to a breakdown in reality monitoring, a 
common feature of major mental illness,” is a major contributing 
factor to such false confessions.33 And there is no disputing Allison 
Redlich’s conclusion that “legal safeguards for persons with mental 
disorders afford little protection during the investigation phase” of 
a criminal case,34 the period of time during which such false 
confessions are most likely to occur.35 
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Atkins, defendants with 
intellectual disabilities “have diminished capacities to understand 
and process information, to communicate, to abstract from 
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, 
to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”36 
                                                                                                     
 32. Gisli Gudjonsson et al., Custodial Interrogation, False Confession, and 
Individual Differences: A National Study Among Icelandic Youth, 41 PERSONALITY 
& INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 49 (2006); Gisli Gudjonsson et al., Confessions and 
Denials and the Relationship with Personality, 9 LEG. & CRIMINOLOGICAL 
PSYCHOL. 121 (2004); Gisli Gudjonsson et al., Interrogation and False Confession 
Among Adolescents in Seven European Countries: What Background and 
Psychological Variables Best Discriminate Between False Confessors and Non-
False Confessors?, 15 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 711 (2009).  
 33. Saul Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 14 (2010). From 1990 to 2013, 2000 
defendants were found to have been falsely convicted; 300 of the exonerations 
were the results of DNA testing. These facts “defy common belief” that wrongful 
convictions are “extremely rare” occurrences. Rachel Pecker, Note, Quasi-Judicial 
Prosecutors and Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence: Granting Recusals to Make 
Impartiality a Reality, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2013).  
 34. Allison D. Redlich, Law & Psychiatry: Mental Illness, Police 
Interrogations, and the Potential for False Confession, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 19 
(2004). 
 35. See generally JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO 
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000). See 
also Jennifer J. Ratliff et al., The Hidden Consequences of Racial Salience in 
Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 200, 
200–01 (2010) (reporting how 15% of false confessions took place during the initial 
interrogation phase). 
 36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002). 
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When discussing false convictions in death penalty cases of 
individuals with mental disabilities, Professor John Blume and his 
colleagues considered the following, in addition to the false 
confessions issue: (1) the difficulties such individuals have 
assisting counsel; (2) their often inappropriate demeanor; and 
(3) their vulnerability to exploitation by codefendants and/or 
snitches.37 
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
There is typically great political incentive for prosecutors to 
seek the death penalty and for trial judges to impose it.38 Professor 
James Liebman explains: 
In all capital-sentencing jurisdictions, but particularly in 
ones where the political rewards of capital punishment 
are high and direct (for example, where elections for 
district attorney and trial judge are frequent and partisan 
and where voters favor the death penalty) and in ones that 
believe themselves to be under siege from violent crime, 
such offenses create incentives to move swiftly and surely 
from arrest to conviction to capital verdict.39 
                                                                                                     
 37. See John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Susan E. Millor, Convicting 
Lennie: Mental Retardation, Wrongful Convictions, and the Right to a Fair Trial, 
56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 943, 954–58 (2012) (explaining how defendants with 
mental illness often act “tough” or “hardened” to conceal their confusion, which 
complicates any effective defense from their counsel, makes them appear 
heartless in front of the jury, and makes them vulnerable to the tricks of other 
codefendants). 
 38. Of course, the starting point is the reality that it is the prosecutor who 
decides whether or not to pursue the death penalty in a given case. See Pecker, 
supra note 33, at 1619 (describing how the extent of prosecutorial discretion has 
led the Supreme Court to refer to prosecutors as “judicial or quasi-judicial 
officers”).  
 39. James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 315, 322 (2002). In a footnote, Liebman quotes a newspaper article by Tina 
Rosenberg about Philadelphia district attorney Lynne Abraham’s self-confessedly 
“passionate” commitment to capital punishment, notwithstanding her doubts 
whether it deters crime, and her use of it more often per homicide than any other 
prosecutor in the nation, which follows from her conclusion that it gives citizens 
“the feeling of control demanded by a city in decay,” especially in light of her 
observation that “[w]e feel our lives are not in our own hands . . . This is Bosnia”. 
Id. at 322 n.36 (quoting Tina Rosenberg, Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 
1995, at 22). For more information on the special issues raised in jurisdictions in 
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In this context, is important to note how the imposition of the 
death penalty is basically a county-by-county issue, resulting in 
this anomaly: over a twenty-two year period, sixty-six American 
counties accounted for 2,569 of the 5,131 death sentences 
imposed.40 Perhaps even more astonishingly, just 16% of the 
nation’s counties (510 out of 3,143) accounted for 90% of its death 
verdicts in the period.41 Police, prosecutors, judges, and juries 
operate with “strong incentives to generate as many death 
sentences as they can—reaping robust psychic, political, and 
professional rewards—while displacing the costs of their many 
consequent mistakes onto capital prisoners, post-trial review 
courts, victims, and the public.”42  
There is often “acute (and ever intensifying) political pressure” 
on prosecutors “to seek the death penalty.”43 Because defendants 
with mental disabilities most engage a community’s fears, this 
                                                                                                     
which prosecutors are elected, see Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking 
Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates’ 
Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 941, 947 (1994). For 
more information on the incentives in some jurisdictions supporting the pursuit 
of death penalties by prosecutors, see Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An 
Empirical Look at the Interplay between Institutional Incentives and Bounded 
Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999 (2009). 
 40. James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: 
The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 264–65 n.40 (2011).  
 41. See id. at 265 (noting that, statistically, juries composed of 10% of 
American residents were responsible for 38% of the capital sentences). 
Philadelphia is discussed in this context in depth in Robert Smith, The Geography 
of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 260–61 (2012) 
(relaying the categorizing process that Philadelphia defense attorneys use to 
properly defend capital cases). See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide 
Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death 
Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010). 
 42. James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 
2032 (2000); see also Liebman & Clarke, supra note 40, at 295 (“Local prosecutors 
stand to gain by imposing as many death verdicts as possible, regardless of the 
verdicts’ failure rate on appeal, because they quickly realize the political gains, 
and the costs of review and reversal are slow to materialize and shouldered by 
others.”). Professor J. Amy Dillard is clear: “Prosecutors abuse their discretion 
when they choose to seek death in order to seat a death-disposed jury.” J. Amy 
Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the Categorical 
Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 
961, 1005 (2011). 
 43. Brian L. Vander Pol, Note: Relevance and Reconciliation: A Proposal 
Regarding the Admissibility of Mercy Opinions in Capital Sentencing, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 707, 709 & n.2 (2003). 
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pressure is certainly not diminished in cases of defendants with 
mental disabilities.44 And of course, because prosecutors “reap 
political benefits from being tough on crime but do not typically 
have to pay for expensive appeals, they have an incentive to seek 
the death penalty in marginal cases that may be hard to defend on 
appeal.”45 They adopt a “conviction psychology,” one that presumes 
guilt in all cases.46 And these tactics, sadly, inevitably play well 
with jurors.47 
Consider the 2014 exoneration of two African-American 
mentally disabled death row inmates—one with an IQ in the 60s, 
and the other with an IQ of 49—who were exonerated by DNA 
evidence, some twenty years after the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on their cases (over a stinging dissent by Justice 
Blackmun), when it was determined that their confessions were 
coerced and that they were factually innocent.48 The District 
Attorney who prosecuted the case—Joe Freeman Britt—was 
profiled later on “Sixty Minutes” as the nation’s “deadliest D.A. 
because he sought the death penalty so often.”49 Notwithstanding 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Deborah C. Scott, et al., Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: 
Connecticut’s Psychiatric Security Review Board, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 980, 982 (1990) (noting that persons with mental disabilities are “the 
most despised and feared group in society”). 
 45. Gershowitz, supra note 41, at 347–48. 
 46. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1010 n.208 (2009); see also George T. 
Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 110–19 (1975) 
(defining “conviction psychology” as the mindset of a prosecutor who does not 
believe that an innocent person would ever end up a criminal defendant). 
 47. See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 553 (4th ed. 2012) (discussing former Oklahoma City District 
Attorney Robert Macy, who, according to journalistic accounts, “lied, . . . bullied, 
[and] spurned the rules of a fair trial, concealing evidence, misrepresenting 
evidence,” and yet consistently won re-election with more than 70% of the vote). 
 48. See McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1254 (1994) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (“That our system of capital punishment would single out Buddy 
McCollum to die for this brutal crime only confirms my conclusion that the death 
penalty experiment has failed.”); see also Jonathan Katz & Erick Eckholm, DNA 
Evidence Clears Two Men in 1983 Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), at A1 
(noting that the DNA evidence proved their neighbor—whose involvement had 
been overlooked by the police, despite his confession to a rape and murder at a 
concurrent time—had been responsible for the heinous crime). 
 49. See Matt Schudel, Joe Freeman Britt, Prosecutor Who Sent Dozens to 
Death Row, Dies at 80, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/national/joe-freeman-britt-prosecutor-who-sent-dozens-to-death-row-
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the DNA evidence, he told the press recently that he “still believed 
the men were guilty,”50 indicating that he “could not understand 
why much faith is put in DNA evidence.”51 Revealingly, in 
discussing the issue of the false confession, Britt said: “When we 
tried these cases, every time they would bring in shrinks to talk 
about how retarded they were[ ]. . . . It went on and on, blah-blah-
blah.”52 The current DA—a distant cousin—subsequently called 
Britt a bully, to which Britt replied, “If I was a bully, he is a pussy. 
How about that?”53 
There are two back-stories here—to the best of my knowledge, 
generally unreported in the popular press—that need be shared as 
well. First, during the North Carolina state legislative election 
campaign in November 2010,  
the state Republican Party mailed a flyer that depicted mug 
shots of two death row inmates, Wayne Laws and Henry 
McCollum, to households in districts with contested races. The 
flyer described their brutal crimes and cautioned the targeted 
voters that because of their ‘ultra-liberal’ representative, Laws 
                                                                                                     
dies-at-80/2016/04/15/b246f27e-025b-11e6-b823-707c79ce3504_story.html (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (attributing the quote “[g]o after them and tear that jugular 
out” to Britt, as stated in the “60 Minutes” interview) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Richard Oppel, As Two Men Go Free, a Dogged Ex-Prosecutor Digs In, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), at A1, A13. On prosecutorial misconduct in other cases 
involving potentially-exculpatory DNA evidence, see Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful 
Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 163, 178 (2007) (discussing Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1063 (10th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. Other examples abound. Rachel Pecker notes: 
In a recent Illinois exoneration, the district attorney resisted a finding 
of innocence after DNA excluded five male defendants who had falsely 
confessed to the crime when they were teenagers. She explained, “[a]s 
a prosecutor, I have a duty to the victims in this case.” Another 
prosecutor explained, “[t]he taxpayers don’t pay us for intellectual 
curiosity. They pay us to get convictions.”  
Pecker, supra note 33, at 1618 n.38 (quoting Erica Goode, When DNA Evidence 
Suggests ‘Innocent,’ Some Prosecutors Cling to ‘Maybe,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 
2011), at A19 and Andrew Martin, The Prosecutor’s Case Against DNA, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011), § 6, at 44).. 
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and McCollum “might be moving out of jail and into [y]our 
neighborhood sometime soon.”54  
Second, in the case of Callins v. Collins,55 in dissenting from 
the Court’s decision to not grant certiorari, Justice Blackmun 
famously said that he would “no longer tinker with the machinery 
of death,” and would never vote again to affirm a death penalty 
conviction.56 In response to Justice Blackmun, Justice Scalia 
sneered at the decision to announce this manifesto in the case 
before the court, noting that it was “less brutal” than many others, 
counterpointing with the facts of the McCollum case:  
The death-by-injection which Justice BLACKMUN describes 
looks pretty desirable next to that. It looks even better next to 
some of the other cases currently before us which Justice 
BLACKMUN did not select as the vehicle for his announcement 
that the death penalty is always unconstitutional—for example, 
the case of the eleven year-old girl raped by four men and then 
                                                                                                     
 54. Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Confronting Race: How a 
Confluence of Social Movements Convinced North Carolina to Go Where the 
McCleskey Court Wouldn’t, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 500–01 (2011) (quoting 
Rob Christensen, Potshots Turn Nasty in N.C. Legislative Races: Democrats and 
Republicans Resort to Outdated Charges, Fear-Mongering, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER 
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/10/21/1776187/potshots-
turn-nasty-in-nc-legislative.html#ixzz1I7LpvV1v (last visited July 19, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). Of course, how a state legislator 
could free a convicted prisoner was never explained, but the campaign was 
successful. 
 55. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994). 
 56. Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun further stated:  
For more than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—
along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and 
substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of 
fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle 
the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved 
and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and 
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty 
experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no 
combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can 
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. 
The basic question—does the system accurately and consistently 
determine which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—cannot be answered in 
the affirmative. 
Id. 
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killed by stuffing her panties down her throat. See McCollum v. 
North Carolina, cert. pending, No. 93–7200.57 
It clearly never occurred to Scalia that McCollum might have 
been innocent of the crime with which he was charged. In 
commenting on these events, Dahlia Lithwick has perceptively 
observed:  
It was once the case that McCollum was held out, to the 
collective members of the Supreme Court, as the very worst of 
the worst, deserving of death because of the heinousness of his 
crimes. Having shown that he never committed that crime, it 
seems high time to ask whether, in the view of some Supreme 
Court Justices, that would have even made a difference had we 
executed him.58 
We should think about McCollum in the context of Justice 
Scalia’s jaw-dropping assertion that “this Court has never held that 
the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant 
who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a 
habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”59  
I turn my attention now to the trial bench. How do trial judges 
respond in those jurisdictions in which they have the opportunity 
to alter sentences?60 According to a report done by the Equal 
                                                                                                     
 57. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1142–43 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 58. See Dahlia Lithwick, A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice in North 
Carolina, SLATE (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2014/09/henry_lee_mccollum_cleared_by_dna_evidence_in_north_
carolina_after_spending.2.html (Sept. 3, 2014, 5:37 PM) (last visited June 21, 
2016) [hereinafter A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice] (noting that the denial of 
certiorari occurred decades before DNA evidence proved McCollum’s innocence) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Again, as Lithwick points out, 
there is nothing in Justice Blackmun’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in 
McCollum’s case. See McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1255 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that McCollum was factually innocent; his 
opinion is premised on McCollum’s unquestioned developmental disability). 
 59. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 60. In three states (Florida, Alabama, and Delaware), judges have the ability 
to overturn jury sentences in death penalty cases. See Michael L. Radelet, 
Overriding Jury Sentencing Recommendations in Florida Capital Cases: An 
Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 793, 794 (2011) 
(reporting that, while Florida judges have the ability to reverse the jury’s 
determination in either direction, they usually choose to override verdicts that 
hand down life sentences instead of death penalties). As this Article went to press, 
the Delaware Supreme Court found that the state capital sentencing statute 
unconstitutionally allowed a judge (and not a jury) to find an aggravating 
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Justice Institute, in Florida (a state where judges are elected), 
there has not been a single judicial override of a jury-imposed 
death penalty in twelve years; in Alabama (another judicial 
election state), 92% of judicial overrides are to impose death 
sentences in cases in which jurors recommended life 
imprisonment; on the other hand, in Delaware (where judges are 
appointed), no judge has ever imposed a death sentence via judicial 
override.61 Importantly, judges override juries to impose the death 
penalty more often in a judicial election year.62 
IV. Outcomes of Misconduct 
Prosecutorial misconduct is rampant.63 In one Arizona study, 
prosecutorial misconduct was alleged in half of all capital cases, 
and was found by appellate courts to be reversal-worthy in forty-
                                                                                                     
circumstance for the weighing phase. See Rauf v. State, No. 39, 2016 WL 4224252, 
at *1 (Del. Aug. 2, 2016) (holding that the statute was unconstitutional because 
these unconstitutional provisions could not be severed). 
 61. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Using the Death Penalty to Get Re-Elected, ROOT 
(July 20, 2011), http://www.theroot.com/articles/politics/2011/07/judges_death_ 
penalty_used_for_reelection/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (reporting that Alabama 
judges usually exercised their override power when the victim was white) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a further discussion of judicial 
override and the death penalty, see DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: 
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 48 (2010). 
 62. See Ifill, supra note 61 (noting that thirty-eight states still elect their 
judges); see also Fred B. Burnside, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury 
Override, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1017 (1999) (giving examples of judges citing their 
decisions to override jury life sentences in their campaigns or being voted out of 
office for their failure to impose or uphold death verdicts). See generally Stephen 
B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between 
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 
(1995); Daniel Richman, Framing the Prosecution, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 697 n.88 
(2014) (discussing Claire S.H. Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and 
Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Judges, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 
1360, 1361–62 (2013) (comparing the sentencing variation among elected and 
appointed judges in Kansas)). On this variation in the area of sentencing of sex 
offenders (coming to a similar conclusion), see Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. 
Perlin, “They’re Planting Stories in the Press”: The Impact of Media Distortions on 
Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185 (2013). 
 63. On how available statistics “significantly underreport the extent of 
prosecutorial misconduct,” see David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial 
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional 
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 212 (2011). 
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percent of that cohort.64 The important question, though, is what 
happens when there is prosecutorial misconduct? In a study of the 
thirteen executions that have occurred in California since the 
death penalty was reinstated there in 1977, “prosecutorial 
misconduct has been raised as a significant issue in seven—more 
than half.”65 This cohort of cases includes at least one case in which 
the prosecutor lied—there is no other word for it—to the jury about 
the consequences if a “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict were 
to be entered,66 lies that the California Supreme Court later 
deemed to be “harmless error.”67 Certainly, this sort of judicial 
behavior bespeaks the sort of complicity discussed earlier. 
As I have previously written: 
Other cases from other jurisdictions show this same judicial 
sanctioning of lies on the consequences of a successful insanity 
plea. In only one jurisdiction [Florida] have convictions been 
reversed in such circumstances, the reviewing court in one case 
noting that ‘the prosecution cannot suggest to the jury that an 
                                                                                                     
 64. Michael Kiefer, Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged in Half of Capital 
Cases, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 28, 2013 11:09 AM), http://www.azcentral. 
com/news/arizona/articles/20131027milke-krone-prosecutors-conduct-day1.html 
(last updated Nov. 25, 2013) (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling that the prosecution has the burden of reporting any exonerating evidence 
that they find) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. Natasha Minsker, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 45 
CAL. W. L. REV. 373, 375 (2009) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death 
Penalty Cases]; see also Natasha Minsker & Daniel Ballon, Forum Column, SAN 
FRANCISCO DAILY J. (Oct. 18, 2007). 
 66. Minsker, supra note 65, at 382–87 (discussing People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 
3d 660 (1988)). As reported in MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra 
note 9, at 246 n.129, the prosecutor’s comments included the following: 
“We are letting justice be decided on the basis of how well a psychiatrist 
can sell their bag of tricks,” and, “they [psychiatrists] are so vain as to 
think they are capable of all these magical, mystical things they say 
they are capable of.” 
“[W]e have a social cancer in our community now, and it is this very 
process of allowing psychiatrists to come in and make their moral 
pronouncements disguised as medical opinion in the hopes of 
persuading jurors to let people off the hook.” 
“I’m going to find this guy crazy and let him go home.” 
“[E]very time somebody gets mad, they are free to commit any crime 
they want, and they can be found not guilty by reason of insanity.” 
 67. MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 705. 
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acquittal would result in the defendant’s release from an 
asylum in just a few months.’68 
Often, even where prosecutorial misconduct in such is found, 
the errors are deemed harmless, not of constitutional 
magnitude, or improperly preserved. Nearly seventy years ago, 
Judge Jerome Frank charged that ‘Government attorneys, 
without fear of reversal, may say just about what they please in 
addressing juries, for our rules on the subject are pretend-rules.’ 
Little has changed since.69 
Convictions in cases replete with serious prosecutorial 
misconduct are regularly affirmed, whether they are based on 
inflammatory statements to jurors in closing arguments,70 on 
                                                                                                     
 68. Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed, supra note 13, at 268 
(quoting Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346, 1354 (Fla. 1990)). See, e.g., Lautner 
v. Berghuis, 694 F. Supp. 2d 698, 729 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (stating that 
inappropriate questions directed to an expert witness can be harmless, since 
juries are “free to disregard the expert testimony and draw [their] own 
conclusions from the evidence and lay testimony” (citation omitted)); McGregor v. 
Gibson, 219 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (basing the decision on the fact that federal 
habeas relief is not mandated by state law errors), overruled en banc on other 
grounds, 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001). In Lautner, the prosecutor also warned 
that the defendant would go free if found not guilty for reason of insanity, stating, 
“Now folks are we going to turn [defendant] loose on society by reason of 
insanity[?]” Lautner, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 730. In McGregor, the prosecutor 
indicated to prospective jurors that Mr. McGregor would walk out of the 
courtroom a free man if the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity. 
McGregor, 219 F.3d at 1256. 
 69. Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed, supra note 13, at 268; see also 
State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892, 915 (Utah 2012) (using the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard to determine whether an error was harmless enough for the 
reviewing court to leave the conviction in place); Morris v. Hedgpeth, No. EDCV 
09–00664 VAP (SS), 2011 WL 3861650, at *24–25 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) 
(explaining that prosecutorial misconduct can violate the Constitution and still 
not violate due process if the error was harmless); People v. Cruz, 605 P.2d 830 
(Cal. 1980) (stating that, to preserve allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on 
appeal, the defense counsel must have objected during the trial and requested 
jury admonitions). 
 70. For examples of these cases, see generally U.S. ex rel. Tenner v. Gilmore, 
No. 97 C 2305, 1998 WL 721115 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 1998); Dunigan v. Yarborough, 
No. ED CV 04-00498-CAS (VBK), 2009 WL 6824504 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009); 
Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050 (Pa. 2012); People v. Babbitt, 755 P.2d 
253 (Cal. 1988). In Frederick v. State, the court found no error where the 
prosecutor had argued that defendants who claimed mental illness “had a motive 
to absolve themselves of criminal liability.” 37 P.3d 908, 946 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2001). See also Terry Ganey, Questions Raised about Hulshof’s Performance in 
1996 Murder Case, COLUMBIA (MO.) DAILY TRIBUNE (June 7, 2009, 5:50 AM) 
(updated Jan. 23, 2013 1:13 PM), 
1520 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2016) 
failure to turn over documentary evidence,71 on 
mischaracterization of expert testimony on mental state,72 or on 
mischaracterization of the prevailing legal standard for an 
insanity defense.73 These affirmances are common in cases where 
the insanity defense is proffered,74 where the incompetency status 
is raised,75 where extreme emotional disturbance is alleged,76 and 
where mitigation is sought at the penalty phase77—in short, in 
                                                                                                     
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/perspectives/questions-raised-about-
hulshof-s-performance-in-murder-case/article_fef7d9d4-8fb6-5678-b4fd-5849 
b01a3bcc.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (quoting judge on post-conviction relief 
application in a case of a factually innocent defendant who had been convicted of 
murder as saying, “We now know that none of what Mr. Hulshof [the district 
attorney] said in the final summary was true”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 71. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
the state’s failure to preserve evidence did not necessarily prejudice the trial); 
Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001) (refusing to grant a new trial 
on the basis that minimal effort by the defense counsel should have discovered 
the evidence that the prosecution withheld), reh’g & suggestion for reh’g en banc 
denied (6th Cir. 2001). Coleman was reversed based on a violation of the Supreme 
Court’s effectiveness-of-counsel standard established in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). On the application of Strickland in death 
penalty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities, see MENTAL 
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 123–38. On the question of 
violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in general, see infra notes 
127–128. An expose of the New Orleans District Attorney’s office characterizes it 
as beset by “a culture of indifference about disclosing exculpatory evidence.” 
Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the 
System that Protects Them, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Aug. 1, 2013, 2:18 PM) (updated 
Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-
misconduct-new-orleans-louisiana_n_3529891.html (last visited June 23, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 72. See People v. Smith, 107 P.3d 229, 240 (Cal. 2005) (distinguishing 
between instances in which improper expert testimony is prejudicial or not); 
People v. Blacksher, 259 P.3d 370, 399 (Cal. 2011) (ruling that, although the 
expert testimony was improperly admitted, the defendant was still required to 
establish prejudice). 
 73. See Fleenor v. Farley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1055 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding 
that the misstatement given to the jury was not serious enough to invalidate due 
process). 
 74. See generally Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 75. See generally State v. Neyland, 12 N.E.3d 1112 (Ohio 2014). 
 76. See generally Bowling v. Commonwealth, 873 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1993). 
 77. See generally People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1999); Berry v. 
Epps, No. 1:04CV328-D-D, 2006 WL 2865064 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 5, 2006); Lang v. 
Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Lang was also reversed on a 
Strickland violation. Id. at 1087 (“As respects the bifurcated claim of ineffective 
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cases where a defendant’s mental disability is raised. Although 
there are some instances of reversals,78 in this cohort they are a 
distinct minority.79 Courts simply say that the role of the reviewing 
court is “to act only as a kind of constitutional backstop to ensure 
that trial errors do not so infect the trial as to render it 
fundamentally unfair.”80 This behavior on the part of courts is 
judicial complicity at its worst. 
The scandalous level of inadequacy of counsel81 made 
available to this cohort of defendants is well known. As Stephen 
Bright has concluded, “[t]he death penalty will too often be 
punishment not for committing the worst crime, but for being 
assigned the worst lawyer.”82 Similarly, the Harvard Law Review 
has unequivocally charged: “The utter inadequacy of trial and 
appellate lawyers for capital defendants has been widely 
recognized as the single most spectacular failure in the 
                                                                                                     
assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, the court finds that trial counsel 
provided deficient performance at the penalty phase.”). 
 78. For reversals based on the issue of adequacy of counsel, see Lang, 725 F. 
Supp. 2d at 942, Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001), and Littlejohn 
v. Trammel, 704 F.3d 817, 822 (10th Cir. 2013). For an intermediate appellate 
reversal on the misconduct issue, see Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 314 (6th Cir. 
2000), superseded by statute on other grounds in Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 
2148 (2012) (explaining that the prosecutor’s comments were “peppered with the 
type of ‘know-nothing appeals to ignorance’ that deprive defendants of their right 
to a fair consideration of their insanity defense”). 
 79. For other cases finding no error, see Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217 
(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 933 (2001) abrogated by Neill v. Gibson, 
278 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2001), Sneed v. Johnson, No. 1:04CV 588, 2007 WL 
709778 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2007), and Hamilton v. Ayers, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1075 
(E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 80. Fleenor v. Farley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1053 (S.D. Ind. 1998). See also 
Leslie A. Harris, Putting a Hold on the Death Penalty, 24 HUM. RTS. (Winter 1997) 
(“Congress has systematically dismantled the federal safeguards that serve as a 
constitutional backstop to state proceedings.”). 
 81. See Michael L. Perlin, The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden: 
The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 201, 204 (1996) [hereinafter The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden] 
(stating that Strickland v. Washington established a “pallid, nearly-impossible-
to-violate, adequacy standard,” requiring simply that counsel’s efforts be 
“reasonable” under the circumstances (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 668 (1984))).  
 82. Stephen Bright, Death by Lottery—Procedural Bar of Constitutional 
Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent 
Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 695 (1990). 
1522 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2016) 
administration of capital punishment.”83 I have written about 
inadequacy in this context before and have concluded that it is 
truly a “farce and mockery” to perpetuate a system in which 
grossly unqualified lawyers are appointed to represent defendants 
facing the death penalty, especially in cases where defendants 
have mental disabilities.84 It is essential that this paper be 
contextualized in that reality. It is important to add an additional 
confounding factor here, in the context of the “harmless error” 
cases.85 This doctrine is at play in appellate matters in which there 
was no objection raised or error preserved at trial.86 Such 
substandard counsel, simply put, fails to object to objectionable 
evidence and prosecutorial behavior, making the likelihood of 
reversal—always a slim possibility—even slimmer. Per Professor 
Sharon Dolovich, the case law reflects not just “serious 
incompetence but even incapacitation on the part of counsel.”87 
Since 1908, the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics has 
recognized that the prosecutor’s duty to see that justice is done 
includes an obligation not to suppress facts capable of establishing 
the innocence of the accused.88 In language that has been repeated 
countless times, “The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public 
prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done.”89 
Nonetheless, prosecutorial misconduct is the basis for over a fifth 
                                                                                                     
 83. Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in 
Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1923 (1994). 
 84. MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 135. 
 85. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002) (stating that the 
government has the opportunity to show that the deviation did not affect the 
defendant’s substantial rights to the extent that the deviation requires reversal); 
see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (asking whether it is “clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant 
guilty absent the error”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“[A]ny error, defect, irregularity, 
or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). 
 86. See generally (Judge) Harry Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always 
Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995). 
 87. Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 307, 436 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 88. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 5 (1908), reprinted in 
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES WITH THE 
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ANNOTATED AND THE CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 
ANNOTATED (American Bar Association 1957), at 2–3. 
 89. Id. 
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of all death penalty reversals,90 and there is little disputing 
Professor Angela Davis’s conclusion that “prosecutorial 
misconduct is widespread and unchecked.”91 
Scholars and critics have frequently focused on 
“prosecutorial misconduct . . . [and] the injustice of 
subjecting . . . persons with serious mental disorders to capital 
punishment” as essential elements of the “pervasive unfairness” 
in the modern implementation of the death penalty.92 But what 
has mostly escaped attention is the way that prosecutorial 
misconduct festers in especially deadly ways in the trial of cases 
involving this cohort of defendants; in the words of Dr. Saby 
Ghoshray, “the deadly cocktail of racial disparity, inadequate 
counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct continues to interject 
lethal consequences for mentally incapacitated prisoners.”93 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death 
Penalty: What Went Wrong?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 423 (2001) (explaining 
that the other two major categories for reversals were judicial error and defense 
counsel error, at 50% and 19%, respectively); see also Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor, 
In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
695, 704 n.63 (2007) (noting that the most common prosecutorial actions of 
misconduct involved suppressing mitigating or exonerating evidence). 
 91. ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 135 (2007). As Professor Davis has explained elsewhere,  
Defining the universe of prosecutorial misconduct is a difficult 
endeavor. Because it is so difficult to discover, much prosecutorial 
misconduct goes unchallenged, suggesting that the problem is much 
more widespread than the many reported cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct would indicate. As one editorial described the problem, ‘It 
would be like trying to count drivers who speed; the problem is larger 
than the number of tickets would indicate.  
Angela Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 278 (2007). For other discussions of prosecutorial 
misconduct, see generally Bresler, supra note 39, at 954; Kim Wherry Toryanski, 
No Ordinary Party: Prosecutorial Ethics and Errors in Death Penalty Cases, 54 
FED. LAW. 45 (Jan. 2007). 
 92. Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death 
Penalty, 1973–1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 2–3 (1994); see also Shannon 
Heery, If It’s Constitutional, Then What’s the Problem?: The Use of Judicial 
Override in Alabama Death Sentencing, 34 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 347, 381 (2010) 
(discussing imposition of the death penalty in Alabama). Appeals often focus on 
both issues. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the 
Aftermath of the Ryan Commutations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New 
Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 1352 n.207 (2010) 
(discussing People v. Ramsey, 942 N.E. 2d 1168 (Ill. 2010)). 
 93. Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the Evolving Standards 
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Professor Alafair Burke and others have raised the question of 
whether many cases of prosecutorial misconduct may be more 
attributable to cognitive bias94 than intentional malfeasance,95 
but in this context, that attribution, while intellectually 
interesting, in no way minimizes the harm done by some 
prosecutors.96  
Why should prosecutors reform their ways? There is often 
absolutely no accountability.97 In some jurisdictions, convictions 
                                                                                                     
of Decency: The Supreme Court’s Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45 J. CATH. 
LEGAL STUD. 561, 617 (2006). 
 94. Cognitive biases are heuristic cognitive-simplifying devices that distort 
our abilities to consider information rationally. See generally Michael L. Perlin, 
“Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the 
Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 343, 
365 n.127 (2013), and sources cited. The heuristic at play here is the confirmation 
bias through which we focus on information that confirms our preconceptions. See 
generally Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender 
Recidivism Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized 
Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2012) 
[hereinafter Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism] (quoting Eden B. King, 
Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 54, 58 (2011)). Cognitive bias can also lead prosecutors 
“to uphold their colleagues’ (other prosecutors’) decisions, as they would want 
those prosecutors to do for them.” Pecker, supra note 33, at 1623 (citing Catherine 
Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the 
Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 
CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 294 (2001)). 
 95. See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 
481, 492–98 (2009) (explaining reasons why prosecutors who are otherwise 
conscientious and ethical might withhold evidence); see also Susan Bandes, 
Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 
479 (2006) [hereinafter Loyalty to One’s Convictions] (noting how prosecutors 
have a “tendency to develop a fierce loyalty to a particular version of events”); 
Alafair Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1594 (2006) (discussing tests that 
have shown the effect that cognitive bias has on test subjects); Ellen Yaroshefsky, 
Keynote Address: Enhancing the Justice Mission in the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 343, 348 (2010) (extrapolating on the 
necessity of zealous defense counsel to keep prosecutors from committing 
intentional or unintentional violations). 
 96. On the “strong temptations” that prosecutors face to “shirk” their ethical 
duties, see Bibas, supra note 46, at 1015, and see generally Loyalty to One’s 
Convictions, supra note 95; Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial 
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 138–48 
(2004). 
 97. See, e.g., Keenan et al., supra note 63, at 212–13 (explaining how the 
“harmless error” standard forces the defendant to not only prove prosecutorial 
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are rarely reversed on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.98 For 
those in jurisdictions where it is an elective office, convictions 
enhance re-electability.99 Even if the misconduct is noticed, the 
defendant’s conviction is still likely to stand. And there is no 
stigma to the miscreant prosecutor since he is virtually never 
mentioned by name in any subsequent appellate opinion.100 
Sanctions are nearly non-existent; by way of example, “a Chicago 
Tribune article found that not one prosecutor was convicted of a 
crime, disbarred, or publicly sanctioned in 381 murder cases where 
the conviction was reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct.”101 
Although scholars have written frequently and persuasively about 
ethical breaches in such cases (and the need to monitor such 
breaches), their words are generally met with overwhelming 
indifference.102 
This leads to a further inquiry: To what extent are prosecutors 
to blame for this state of affairs? I believe that at least four global 
charges can be leveled against members of the prosecutoriate with 
regard to the specific issue of the misuse and/or exploitation of 
evidence of mental disability in death penalty cases: (1) the misuse 
of evidence to play on the fears and emotions of jurors; (2) the use 
of baseless expert witness testimony; (3) the suppression of 
                                                                                                     
misconduct but also its prejudicial effect, if he wishes to get a verdict overturned). 
 98. See, e.g., Michelle Ghetti & Paul Killebrew, With Impunity: The Lack of 
Accountability of a Criminal Prosecutor, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 349, 353–54 (2012) 
(noting that, of 150 reported cases in Louisiana in which prosecutorial misconduct 
was found, there were only twenty in which convictions were reversed). 
 99. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct 
and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 399, 405 n.31 (2006) (reporting that “more than [ninety-five] percent of chief 
prosecutors on the state and local level are elected”). 
 100. See Ghetti & Killebrew, supra note 98, at 357–58 (comparing criminal 
cases, where the prosecutor’s name is omitted, to civil cases, where the lawyer’s 
name is included and is available for public ridicule if he commits large errors). 
 101. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier et al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in 
Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1370 n.251 (2009) (citing Adam Liptak, 
Prosecutor Becomes Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 4). 
 102. For more on the lack of consequences for prosecutorial misconduct, see 
generally Bresler, supra note 39; Myrna S. Raeder, Symposium: See No Evil: 
Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by 
Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413 (2007); 
Toryanski, supra note 91. 
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evidence; and (4) the improper use of antipsychotic medications at 
trial. This Article discusses these charges in subsequent sections. 
V. “Some Prosecutors Consciously Misuse Mental Disability 
Evidence to Play on the Fears of, to Scare, and to Exploit the 
Ignorance of Jurors.” 103 
As I have discussed in the context of the subset of cases in 
which an insanity defense is raised, prosecutors can lie with 
impunity as to the likely denouement of an insanity acquittal. 
Further, Stephen Bright has noted that, in the death penalty 
context, “most prosecutors and other public officials exploit the 
victims of crime and the death penalty for political gain by 
stirring up and pandering to fears of crime.”104 As I noted in an 
earlier publication, “Professor Evan Mandery has pointed out 
how prosecutors have systematically opposed legislation that 
would exclude persons with serious mental illness from being 
eligible for the death penalty.”105  
Jamie Fellner has carefully criticized the ways that 
prosecutors often “vigorously challenge the existence of mental 
retardation, minimize its significance, and suggest that 
although a capital defendant may ‘technically’ be considered 
retarded, he nonetheless has ‘street smarts’—and hence should 
                                                                                                     
 103. Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed, supra note 13, at 9. 
 104. Stephen Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime: Costly, 
Counterproductive and Corrupting, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069, 1076 (1996). 
 105. MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 121 (citing 
Evan J. Mandery, Executing the Insane, Retribution, and Temporal Justice, 43 
CRIM. L. BULL. 981, 981–82 n.7 (2007) (quoting Andrea Weigl, Limit to Death 
Penalty Sought; Bill Would Protect the Mentally Ill, NEWS & OBSERVER, May 13, 
2007, at B1 (noting opposition by prosecutors to a North Carolina bill excluding 
the mentally ill from the reach of the state death penalty statute), and Mike 
Smith, Bill Would Ban Executions of Mentally Ill, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 
23, 2001 (noting that the Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council opposes an 
Indiana bill to exclude the mentally ill on grounds that jurors “should be able to 
hear evidence and decide the issue of mental illness during the sentencing phases 
of capital cases” and out of concern with the “ever expanding list of what 
constitutes mental illness”))). See generally, What Atkins Could Mean, supra note 
7; Emily Randolph, “Furiosis Solo Furore Punitur”: Should Mentally Ill Capital 
Offenders Be Categorically Exempt from the Death Penalty?, 3 MENT. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y J. 578 (2014) (arguing that such offenders should be exempt from the 
death penalty). 
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receive the highest penalty.”106 In 2014, Hall v. 
Florida107 held that Florida’s “bright line” test of a seventy IQ as 
the “gold standard” for executability was unconstitutional as it 
created an “unacceptable risk” that persons with intellectual 
disabilities would be executed, and was contrary to all professional 
judgment.108 In support of the majority’s views, Justice Kennedy 
noted that neither Florida nor its supporting amici could “point to 
a single medical professional who supports this cutoff,” and that 
Florida’s rule “goes against unanimous professional consensus.”109 
In dissent, Justice Alito dismissed this universal expert position as 
not reflecting the position of the American people but, “at best, 
represent[ing] the views of a small professional elite.”110 As such, 
there is certainly some support in the U.S. Supreme Court for this 
position that Fellner ably and appropriately decries.111 
                                                                                                     
 106. Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental 
Retardation, 28 HUM. RTS. 9, 12 (2002).  
 107. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 108. Id. at 1990. 
 109. Id. at 2000. 
 110. Id. at 2005 (emphasis added). See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS 
CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (3d ed. 2016), § 17-4.2.3, at 
17-117, 17-118 (critiquing Justice Alito’s opinion in this context). In a recent 
article, Nancy Haydt, a veteran death penalty defense lawyer, notes drily that 
Justice Alito thus “suggests that the general public has experience and training 
in mental disorders.” Nancy Haydt, The DSM-5 and Criminal Defense: When Does 
a Diagnosis Make a Difference?, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 847, 849 n.17 (2015). 
 111. Justice Alito’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia 
and Justice Thomas. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001; see also generally Christopher 
Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v. Florida and the 
Possibility of a “Scientific Stare Decisis”, 23 WM. & MARY BILL  RTS. J. 415 (2014) 
(discussing Hall). The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari in Moore v. 
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2407 (2016), on the question of “[w]hether it violates the Eighth 
Amendment and this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 
(2014), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), to prohibit the use of current 
medical standards on intellectual disability, and require the use of outdated 
medical standards, in determining whether an individual may be executed.” 
Question 1, Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Texas, in the case Ex Parte Briseno, 
135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), had created a standard based on the 
characteristics of Lennie, a fictional character in John Steinbeck’s novel Of Mice 
and Men. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Consider Legal Standard Drawn 
From ‘Of Mice and Men, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/politics/supreme-court-to-consider-legal-
standard-drawn-from-of-mice-and-men.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) 
(reporting on how Texas developed a standard that does not reflect current 
medical advances in determining mental disabilities) (on file with the Washington 
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VI. Some Prosecutors Consciously Seek out Expert Witnesses Who 
Will Testify—with Total Certainty—to a Defendant’s Alleged 
Future Dangerousness, Knowing that Such Testimony Is Baseless. 
The worthless and baseless testimony of Dr. James Grigson on 
questions of future dangerousness, and how that testimony led 
inexorably to the improper executions of defendants with mental 
disabilities, is well known.112 Dr. Grigson was decertified by the 
American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Society of 
Psychiatric Physicians in 1995,113 but he continued to testify in 
death penalty proceedings for years after that.114 A simple 
Westlaw search reveals fifty-seven such cases from 1995 until his 
death in 2004.115 To the best of my knowledge, there have been no 
sanctions brought against any of the prosecutors who retained him 
to testify in this cohort of cases. 
In this context, it is also essential to consider what Robert 
Sanger recently unearthed about expert testimony in cases 
assessing whether a defendant met the standards set down in 
Atkins v. Virginia.116 In his comprehensive article, Sanger 
examines the ways that: 
                                                                                                     
and Lee Law Review). 
 112. See MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 19–28 
(discussing Dr. Grigson). On the science attendant to risk assessments of future 
dangerousness, see Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of 
Criminal History on Risk Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75 (2015). On risk 
assessment evaluations in general, see John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk 
Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 391 (2006).  
 113. See Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 556 n.6 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining 
the circumstances behind Dr. Grigson’s loss of his license). 
 114. See Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The Influence of 
the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 189, 257 n.331 (2004) (discussing Sterling v. Cockrell, No. Civ.A. 3:01-
CV-2280, 2003 WL 21488632, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2003) (noting that state 
offered to make Dr. Grigson available as forensic psychiatric expert)). 
 115. This result was derived from searching for “<(“dr. james grigson”) (james 
+2 grigson) & da(aft 1995 & bef 2004)>(ALLSTATES database)” on February 8, 
2016; Dr. Grigson died in 2004. 
 116. See generally Robert Sanger, IQ, Intelligence Tests, “Ethnic Adjustments” 
and Atkins, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 87 (2015). In a recent article, I re-examine Sanger’s 
masterful article in the particular context of prosecutorial misconduct. See 
generally Michael L. Perlin, “Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You Blind”: 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Use of “Ethnic Adjustments” in Death Penalty 
Cases of Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 1437 (2016). 
“MERCHANTS AND THIEVES, HUNGRY FOR POWER” 1529 
Since Atkins, some prosecution experts have begun using so-
called “ethnic adjustments” to artificially raise minority 
defendants’ IQ scores, making defendants who would have been 
protected by Atkins and its progeny eligible for the death 
penalty. [This] Article details this practice, looking at several 
cases in which prosecutors successfully persuaded courts to 
accept testimony that adjusted a defendant’s IQ score upward, 
based on his or her race, and considers arguments put forth by 
prosecutors for increasing minority defendants’ IQ scores in this 
manner.117  
Sanger concludes that this practice is “logically, clinically, and 
constitutionally unsound.”118 I agree and would add only that it is 
also, I believe, immoral.119 
VII. Some Prosecutors Suppress Exculpatory Psychiatric 
Evidence.120 
Over the years, there have been multiple examples of cases in 
which prosecutors have concealed psychiatric evidence that: 
(1) might have made trial impossible; (2) might have cast doubt on 
the veracity of state’s witnesses; (3) created doubt as to the 
                                                                                                     
 117. Sanger, supra note 116, at 87–88. 
 118. Id. at 146; see also Susan Unok Marks, Courts’ Elusive Search for the 
Meaning of Intellectual Disability for Evaluating Atkins Claims, 26 U. FLA. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 347, 379 (2015) (“In reviewing the cases that have raised Atkins 
claims, it is striking how many of the cases reported significantly troublesome 
conditions during the defendants’ childhood.”). 
 119. See Jennifer Bard, Diagnosis Dangerous: Why State Licensing Boards 
Should Step in to Prevent Mental Health Practitioners from Speculating Beyond 
the Scope of Professional Standards, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 929, 929 (suggesting that 
“state licensing boards be held responsible for assuring mental health 
professionals do not testify beyond the scope of medical support or evidence” in 
death penalty cases under such circumstances). On prosecutorial use of “corrupt 
science” more broadly, see Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors and Corrupt Science, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2007). 
 120. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that “the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963). The goal advanced by imposing meaningful sanctions for Brady violations 
is “not merely to punish the individual prosecutor but to ensure that the 
government does not feel empowered to violate constitutional mandates with 
impunity.” Cynthia Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and 
the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 442 (2010). 
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voluntariness of the state’s witnesses; and (4) created doubt as to 
the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession.121 
VIII. Some Prosecutors Sanction the Improper Use of 
Antipsychotic Medications at Trial so as to Make Defendants 
Appear Less Remorseful and as to Make Them Less Capable of 
Consulting with Counsel. 
In 1992, the Supreme Court held, in Riggins v. Nevada,122 that 
the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to a 
competent defendant proffering an insanity defense violated his 
due process rights.123 Although the Court did not set down a bright-
line test articulating the state’s burden in sustaining forced 
                                                                                                     
 121. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for 
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C.L. REV. 693, 701 n.42 (1987) (discussing 
Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963), which addressed suppression of 
evidence that both defendants were legally incompetent to stand trial); Powell v. 
Wiman, 287 F.2d 275, 278 n.17 (5th Cir. 1961) (addressing evidence of mental 
illness of key witness, including three different hospitalizations in mental 
institutions); Wallace v. State, 501 P.2d 1036, 1037 (Nev. 1972) (noting a 
psychiatric report revealing defendant’s mental illness that was relevant both to 
voluntariness of confession and to degree of guilt). Sanctions in any Brady case 
are virtually nonexistent. See Rosen, supra, at 730 (analyzing five-year study of 
Brady violations and finding only nine disciplinary actions taken); see also Kuo & 
Taylor, supra note 90, at 704–05, (discussing research reported in Rosen). A 1999 
investigation by the Chicago Tribune identified 381 homicide cases nationally in 
which Brady violations produced conviction reversals. Keenan et al., supra note 
63, at 220 (discussing Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, 
CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-
020103trial1,0,479347.story (last visited June 14, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review)). In not a single case was a prosecutor publicly 
sanctioned. Id.  
There are similar patterns in other nations as well. See generally Rosen, supra 
note 121, at 714 n.116; Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability, Factual Innocence 
and the Death Penalty, in CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN ASIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PAVING THE WAY FOR THE FUTURE 21 (Korean Institute of Criminology ed. 2014).  
On the possible existence of an Eighth Amendment right to discovery in capital 
cases as a means of dealing with Brady violations, see Sanjay K. Chhablani, 
Beyond Brady: An Eighth Amendment Right to Discovery in Capital Cases, 38 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 423 (2014). 
 122. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 110, at 
§ 8-7.2 (discussing this case). 
 123. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137–38. An estimated two-thirds of prisoners and 
40% of jail inmates with mental disabilities have reported taking prescription 
medication. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2015). 
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drugging of a detainee at trial, the Court found that this burden 
would be met had the state demonstrated either (1) medical 
appropriateness, and, considering less intrusive alternatives, 
“essential for the sake of Riggins’s own safety or the safety of 
others,” or (2) a lack of less intrusive means by which to obtain an 
adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.124 The Court 
found that the use of drugs below may well have impaired the 
defendant’s trial rights, as their side effects might have affected 
not just the defendant’s outward appearance, but also “the content 
of his testimony . . . , his ability to follow the proceedings, or the 
substance of his communication with counsel.”125 
At trial, Riggins had been medicated with 800 milligrams of 
the drug Mellaril, considered to be within the “toxic range”;126 an 
expert in the case testified that that was sufficient dosage with 
which to “tranquilize an elephant.”127 In his concurrence, Justice 
Kennedy went further than the majority by focusing on the 
potential impact of these drugs’ side effects on a defendant’s fair 
trial rights, since the drugs could alter his demeanor in a way that 
“will prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom,” 
and render him “unable or unwilling” to assist counsel.128 If the 
medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity to react to the 
proceedings and to demonstrate “remorse or compassion,” the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant can be especially acute at the 
sentencing stage.129 Here, Justice Kennedy relied on the research 
of William Geimer and Jonathan Amsterdam, whose research 
demonstrated that assessment of remorse might be the dispositive 
factor to jurors in death penalty cases.130 
Think of the range of issues that must be considered in such a 
case: 
• At the Symposium at which a version of this Article was 
given, Lloyd Snook, Joseph Giarratano’s trial lawyer, told 
                                                                                                     
 124. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135–36. 
 125. Id. at 137. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 143 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 128. Id. at 142. 
 129. Id. at 144. 
 130. Id. (citing William Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life 
or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 1, 51–53 (1988)). 
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how the excessive amounts of Thorazine given to the 
defendant left him “drooling.”131 Dora Klein has noted 
astutely that “jurors cannot reasonably be expected to 
disregard the days or perhaps weeks that they observed the 
defendant sitting before them sedated and drooling, or 
agitated and twitching.”132  
• In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the demeanor of 
defendants with intellectual disabilities “may create an 
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their 
crimes.”133 In his concurrence in Riggins, Justice Kennedy 
focused on this issue extensively: “assessments of character 
and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be 
determinative of whether the offender lives or dies.”134  
• Some eleven years after Riggins, the Supreme Court 
weighed the right to refuse treatment balance in cases 
involving an incompetent defendant, in Sell v. United 
                                                                                                     
 131. Presentation by Lloyd Snook, Washington and Lee Law Review 
Symposium (Feb. 6, 2016). 
 132. Dora Klein, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs: The Case Against 
Administering Involuntary Medications to a Defendant During Trial, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 165, 207 (2002).  
Whether or not a defendant “drools” has acquired totemic significance in these 
sorts of cases. In the trial of Andrew Goldstein for the murder of Kendra Webdale 
(after whom New York’s outpatient commitment statute, “Kendra’s Law,” was 
named), jurors, who initially rejected Goldstein’s insanity defense, “reported 
crediting testimony that Goldstein did not froth at the mouth or drool, and 
considered his lack of drooling significant to their responsibility determination.” 
See Amanda Pustilnik, Prisons of the Mind: Social Value and Economic 
Inefficiency in the Criminal Justice Response to Mental Illness, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 217, 248 (2005); see also Life Is In Mirrors, supra note 11, at 334–
35 (“Jurors often expect people with mental retardation to be extremely low 
functioning and may not be expecting a quiet, mild-mannered individual. When 
the defendant fails to exhibit any stereotypical behaviors (such as drooling, 
giggling, smiling with a vacant appearance, rocking), jury members may think 
that the mental retardation defense is untrue or unwarranted.”). For a case 
example in which the prosecutor—with impunity—mocked the defendant’s 
mental illness claim in a death penalty case, see Sheppard v. Bagley, 657 F.3d 
338 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Sheppard v. Robinson, 132 S. Ct. 2751 
(2012); see, e.g., Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 30–64, Sheppard v. Bagley, No. 
09-3472 (6th Cir. 2010), ECF No. 57; Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, 
Sheppard v. Bagley, No. 09-3472 (6th Cir. 2010), ECF No. 72. 
 133. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 134. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992). 
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States,135 and the Court stressed the need to inquire as to 
whether such drugs would interfere with the defendant’s 
ability to aid his counsel in preparation of trial.136 In a 
series of books and articles, I have written about the impact 
of sanism and pretextuality137 on the way defendants with 
mental disabilities are treated in the criminal justice 
system.138 An overmedicated defendant—appearing bored, 
apathetic, remorseless—is precisely the sort of defendant 
that jurors will more likely sentence to death.139 
Thus, for almost twenty-five years, prosecutors have been on 
notice that the administration of such medications to defendants 
at their trials may violate due process. What has their track record 
been? A brief inquiry into relevant cases suggests that Riggins has 
been regularly ignored by prosecutors in a wide range of fact-
settings and alleged crimes.140 
                                                                                                     
 135. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 136. Id. at 181; see, e.g., John Hayes, Sell v. United States: Is Competency 
Enough to Forcibly Medicate a Criminal Defendant, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
657, 657 (2004); Tobias Schad, Insane in the Membrane: Arguing Against the 
Forcible Medication of Mentally Ill Pre-Trial Defendants, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 351, 
354–58 (2014). On the use of alternatives to medication in this context, see Adam 
Dayton, United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola: When Criminal Defendants Say No to 
Drugs, 7 B.Y.U.L. REV. 477, 489–91 (2012). 
 137. Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of 
other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social 
attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. See, e.g., Michael L. 
Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. Rev. 373, 374–75 (1992) (providing this 
definition). Pretextuality refers to the way that courts accept (either implicitly or 
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and 
frequently meretricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially 
expert witnesses, show a “high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in 
order to achieve desired ends.” Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped 
Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law 
Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 5 (1999) (quoting in part 
Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary 
Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991)). 
 138. See Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism, supra note 94, at 17–24. 
 139. See Sanist Lives, supra note 19, at 242 (“[T]he most mentally disabled 
persons (those regularly receiving doses of powerful antipsychotic medications) 
are treated the most harshly, and . . . jurors tend to over-impose the death penalty 
on severely mentally disabled defendants.”).  
 140.  Consider some of the relevant post-Riggins cases (not all of which 
involve the death penalty). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gurney, 595 N.E.2d 320, 
325 (Mass. 1992) (noting reversible error to bar defendant from introducing 
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IX. Some Prosecutors Seek the Imposition of the Death Penalty on 
Defendants Who Are, by Any Objective Standard, Incompetent to 
be Executed. 
In Panetti v. Quarterman, the Supreme Court expanded the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against carrying out a death 
sentence upon a prisoner whose mental illness “obstruct[ed] a 
rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.”141 
The Court clarified that defendants must have the opportunity to 
submit adequate expert evidence to respond to evidence on 
competency “solicited by the state court” as part of the defendant’s 
“constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard.”142 In doing so, 
the Court expanded upon the test initially set out in 1986 in Ford 
v. Wainwright that had been interpreted to hold that competency-
to-be-executed depends only on three findings: (1) that the prisoner 
is aware he committed the murders, (2) that he is aware he is going 
to be executed, and (3) that he is aware of the reasons the state has 
given for his execution.143 
Although the Panetti Court does not state this directly, it was 
at least clear in the Fifth Circuit (the federal circuit that includes 
Texas, the state in which Panetti was convicted) that the Ford test 
was no test at all. Panetti’s lawyers told this to the court in their 
petition for certiorari: “Two decades have passed since this Court 
decided Ford, and the Fifth Circuit has yet to find a single death 
row inmate incompetent to be executed. During this same period, 
the State of Texas has executed 360 people.”144 Again, how have 
                                                                                                     
evidence about impact of antipsychotic medication that he was taking at time of 
trial); see also People v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Mich. App. 1997), vacated, 
459 Mich. 21 (1998), reh’g denied, 549 Mich. 1228 (1998) (noting denial of defense 
counsel’s request to have defendant taken off antipsychotic medication for three 
days so that he could testify in unmedicated state deprived defendant of right to 
fair trial); State v. Odiaga, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (Idaho 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
952 (1994), superseded by statute IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-205 (West 2012), as stated 
in State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548 (2008) (noting that denial of defendant’s motion 
to terminate antipsychotic medication violated constitution). For a later case, see 
United States v. Sampson, 820 F. Supp .2d 202, 248 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting 
evidence relating to Sampson’s appearance at trial can be factored into the 
cumulative prejudice analysis, relying on Riggins). 
 141. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957–58 (2007). 
 142. Id. at 952. 
 143. Id. at 956. 
 144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Panetti, No. 06-6407, 2006 WL 3880284 
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prosecutors behaved in the wake of Panetti?145 Although the 
Panetti prosecutorial misconduct intersection has not been 
extensively explored, the case of Cole v. Roper146 should make it 
clear that Panetti is in no way a panacea for the problems raised 
here.  
X. The Outcomes 
Prosecutors’ associations have been globally indifferent to 
efforts to sanction those who violate the law and the spirit of justice 
in such cases.147 A startling exception to this global indifference 
came in the form of a Supreme Court amicus brief filed by six 
former Tennessee prosecutors, who argued that the behavior of the 
trial prosecutor in the case of Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman had crossed 
a line that had “taint[ed] all members of the Tennessee bar.”148 But 
this action by prosecutors is a lonely exception.149 
                                                                                                     
at *26. 
 145. Panetti has been cited favorably in a case involving egregious Brady 
violations. See Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009) 
The prosecutor’s conduct at issue here, then, is akin to a fraud on the 
federal habeas courts; that is, the prosecutor took affirmative actions 
to conceal his tacit agreement with the state’s key witness until it was 
too late, procedurally, for Mr. Douglas to use that undisclosed 
agreement successfully to challenge his capital conviction. 
 146. 783 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the state’s incorrect 
decision of due process claims did not result in an unreasonable application of 
Panetti, and that state court’s failure to hold a more formal hearing regarding 
competency to be executed did not warrant habeas relief). 
 147. See, e.g., Steve Weinberg, Turning on Their Own: A Group of Former 
Prosecutors Cites a Colleague’s Pattern of Misconduct, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(June 26, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2003/06/26/5522/turning-
their-own (last updated June 18, 2016) (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) ) [hereinafter 
Turning on Their Own] (noting a unique amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of a 
Tennessee death row inmate (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
   148. Id. 
 149. See id. (discussing the actions of these Tennessee prosecutors); see also 
Steve Weinberg, Unbecoming Conduct: A Prosecutor in Nashville Is Accused of 
Manipulating Evidence to Send a Defendant to Death Row, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.–
Dec. 2003, at 29 (discussing denial of certiorari in Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 
88 (2002)). See generally Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 999 F. Supp. 1073 (M.D. Tenn. 
1998) (noting that prosecutor’s misconduct included suppression and 
misrepresentation of evidence of defendant’s major mental illness);. 
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Judicial sanction is rare as well.150 In a study of 707 cases in 
which California courts explicitly found prosecutorial misconduct, 
the offending prosecutors were “almost never discipline[d].”151 In 
his exhaustive study of cases involving prosecutorial misconduct 
in jury argument, Professor Bennett Gershman (a former 
prosecutor) was able to find only one decision in which such 
conduct resulted in discipline.152 Another study of 318 cases 
involving homicide defendants who received new trials because of 
prosecutorial misconduct found that one prosecutor was fired (but 
was reinstated on appeal), another received a thirty day in-house 
suspension, and a third’s license was suspended for thirty days for 
other misconduct in the case; not one of the 315 others received any 
kind of sanction from a state disciplinary agency.153 Perhaps this 
should not be surprising as, remarkably, the legal profession has 
never addressed the unique ethical issues that arise in death 
penalty cases.154 
Thoughtful critics have carefully crafted potentially 
ameliorative recommendations, but there has been neither a 
response from organized prosecutors’ associations nor by the 
organized judiciary.155 Consider this wide range of suggestions 
                                                                                                     
 150. On why judges are “disincentivized” from reporting prosecutorial 
misconduct, see Keenan et al., supra note 63, at 210–11.  
 151. Compare Lara Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in 
Addressing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 399 n.12 
(2011) (quoting Northern California Innocence Project, Preventable Error: A 
Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997–2009 (2010)), with Keenan 
et al., supra note 63, at 205 (asserting that the Supreme Court believes that 
“disciplinary procedures effectively deter prosecutorial misconduct”). 
 152. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 
445 (1992) (reporting the results of his study); accord Christopher Slobogin, The 
Death Penalty in Florida, 1 ELON L. REV. 17, 33 (2009) (noting that “in virtually 
none of the [Florida] cases in which prosecutors misbehaved were disciplinary 
measures taken” (footnote omitted)). 
 153. COYNE & ENZEROTH, supra note 47, at 553–54. Two were indicted and 
both indictments were dismissed pre-trial.  
 154. See generally Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, supra 
note 65, at 400. 
 155. On the contrary, a report done by the California District Attorneys’ 
Association argues, vainly, “innocent prisoners are not being executed,” and 
“claims of wrongful convictions are based on misleading, exaggerated data.” 
Compare CA. DIST. ATTY’S ASSOC., PROSECUTORS’ PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA’S 
DEATH PENALTY 27 (2003), http://www.cjlf.org/deathpenalty/DPPaper.pdf, with 
Paul C. Giannelli, Impact of Post-Conviction DNA Testing on Forensic Science, 35 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 627, 627 (2001) (“When DNA evidence was first offered at trial, 
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made by Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier and his colleagues, by 
Center Director for the ACLU of California Center for Advocacy & 
Policy Natasha Minsker, Professor Myrna Raeder, Professor H. 
Mitchell Caldwell, and students in the Yale Law School 
Prosecutorial Ethics and Accountability Project: 
• such offices should responsibly evaluate their 
methods for internal sanctioning of lawyers who 
behave improperly in capital cases;  
• courts, prosecutor offices, and ethics committees 
should together ensure that prosecutors who 
egregiously violate ethics rules in capital cases are 
not allowed to act as counsel in further capital cases;  
• states should pass laws mandating that the death 
penalty may not be sought a second time against a 
defendant when a prosecutor previously committed 
egregious misconduct such as intentionally 
withholding exculpatory evidence;156  
• the “harmless error” analysis should not be applied 
to evaluate misconduct in death penalty cases;  
• prosecutors should not charge death for the purpose 
of securing a plea bargain to a lesser sentence;  
• prosecutors should provide open-file discovery and 
scrupulously disclose to the defense any and all 
information that might be beneficial to the defense, 
either during the guilt or the penalty phase;  
• prosecutors should not seek to mislead the jury about 
the legal requirements for finding in favor of death 
or about the legal consequences of their decision not 
to find for death;  
                                                                                                     
it was vigorously championed by most prosecutors. When the same evidence was 
offered by the defense, however, other prosecutors objected.” (footnote omitted)). 
 156. See Kirchmeier et al., supra note 101, at 1382–84. On the issue of 
training, see The Lone Miscreant, supra note 14, at 727–28 (discussing self-
regulation of prosecutors). 
• prosecutor offices should reevaluate their training 
programs for new and long-time capital attorneys 
regarding ethics in capital cases and how to deal 
with pressures to achieve convictions and death 
sentences;  
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• prosecutors should refrain from public comments 
that could prejudice the defendant in a death penalty 
case;157  
• prosecutorial offices should be required to adopt 
written policies governing the introduction of 
forensic and other expert testimony; 
• prosecutors presenting specific expertise would be 
required to obtain training in such disciplines;  
• prosecutorial offices should implement procedures 
through which one or more prosecutors with 
experience in forensic or social science evidence 
review the introduction of all evidence whose 
reliability has been questioned;158  
• state bar associations must promulgate effective and 
enforceable rules defining the ethical obligations of 
prosecutors;159 and 
• states should create independent commissions for 
prosecutorial oversight.160 
But again, there have been few actions voluntarily taken by 
prosecutors to implement any of these suggestions. In short, 
prosecutors have virtually carte blanche authority to misinform 
jurors, to play to irrational and sanist fears, and to employ 
unscrupulous experts. There are virtually no voices raised in 
opposition, and courts are largely compliant with this state of 
affairs. 
XI. Therapeutic Jurisprudence161 
                                                                                                     
 157. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 65, at 399–
402. 
 158. Raeder, supra note 102, at 1450–51. 
 159. See Keenan et al., supra note 63, at 241–42 (“The ABA should begin a 
dialogue with states and the Department of Justice about expanding Rule 3.8 to 
more completely address the unique ethical challenges that face 
prosecutors . . . These responsibilities are not adequately addressed in the Model 
Rules . . . .”). 
 160. See generally H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, 
Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 98–101 (2013). 
 161.  Portions of the following section are adapted from Michael L. Perlin, 
“Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The International Human Rights 
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One of the most important legal theoretical developments of 
the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of 
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).162 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and 
legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can 
have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.163 It asks 
whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be 
reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not 
subordinating due process principles.164 The law’s use of “mental 
health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] 
impinge upon justice concerns,”165 and inquiries into therapeutic 
                                                                                                     
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 301 (2013), and Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His 
Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have 
Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014). Further, it distills the work of the author over 
the past two decades, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). 
 162. For works discussing this legal theory, see generally, e.g., DAVID B. 
WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); 
DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL 
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, 
Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008); PERLIN 
& CUCOLO, supra note 110, §§ 2-6, at 2-43–2-66. Wexler first used the term in a 
paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David 
B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 32–33 (1992) (using the term 
“therapeutic jurisprudence”). 
 163. Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: 
How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 
42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009) [hereinafter His Brain Has Been Mismanaged 
]; see also, Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & 
Kate Peterson eds., 2006) (for a transnational perspective). 
 164. Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: 
Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of 
Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 508–
11 (2008); Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even Say 
What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse 
Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, Best 
Friend]. 
 165. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of 
Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also, e.g., David Wexler, 
Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPL. & PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179, 184 (1996). 
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outcomes “does not mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil 
rights and civil liberties.”166 
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to 
dignity.167 Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs”: voice, 
validation, and voluntariness,168 arguing: 
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must 
have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision 
maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely 
listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the 
litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from 
a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are 
more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a 
sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant 
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the 
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in 
the very process that engendered the end result or the very 
judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate 
healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In 
general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are 
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 169 
In a recent article about dignity and the civil commitment 
process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum 
embrace therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and 
focus specifically on this issue of voice: “When procedures give 
people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given 
respect, decisions are explained to them, their views taken into 
                                                                                                     
 166. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); 
Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline:” Mental 
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775, 
782 (1998). 
 167. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
MODEL 161 (2005). On dignity in the sentencing process generally, see MENTAL 
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 214–15. 
 168. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education 
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. 
REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the importance of “voice,” see also Ian Freckelton, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and 
Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 588 (2008). 
 169. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 
(2002). See generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE (2010) (advocating the use of therapeutic jurisprudence to 
integrate psychology, mental health, and other related enterprises to enrich and 
shape the law). 
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account, and they substantively feel less coercion.”170 How does 
this “play out” in the context of what I am discussing in this paper?  
Sadly, little has been written about the death penalty from a 
TJ perspective.171 Bruce Winick has argued persuasively that TJ 
supports a policy that prohibits the execution of seriously mentally 
ill offenders as not adequately serving the goals of retribution and 
deterrence.172 Also, Cynthia Adcock—a law professor who spent 
thirteen years representing death penalty defendants—listed 
those affected by the process: lawyers, prosecutors, experts, jurors, 
trial judges and court staff, family members, friends, prison 
employees, the governor, ministers, witnesses to the execution, 
and “finally, the inevitable scores who stand outside the prison 
gates and elsewhere in protest of the execution and others who just 
mourn the death of another prisoner killed by their 
government,”173 and she concluded that there was evidence of 
“psychological devastation caused by the death penalty on those 
who the lawmakers do not intend to be the target of death penalty 
laws.” 174 But there is so much more to consider. 
Think of the issue of medicating incompetent death row 
prisoners so as to make them competent to be executed; this use of 
state-sanctioned psychiatry violates dignity and also delegitimizes 
the process involved, making that process anti-therapeutic not 
solely for those incompetent persons facing death, but for all 
                                                                                                     
 170. Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: 
Rethinking Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1, 51 (2015). 
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the families of victims, see Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, 
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 174. Id. at 293. See David C. Yamada, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Practice of Legal Scholarship, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 121, 138–39 (2010) (discussing 
Adcock’s work, and noting that Adcock “reminds us of emotional consequences of 
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subject to the same penalty.175 Think of the ways that prosecutors 
play on the fears of and exploit the ignorance of jurors in these 
cases; these actions rob defendants of dignity and deny them a 
voice.176 Similarly, prosecutors who call expert witnesses knowing 
that the “scientific bases” of the experts’ testimony is baseless 
(perhaps, at this point in time, fraudulent) similarly invalidate the 
legitimacy of the proceedings in question.177 
Think further of the issues related to adequacy of counsel. As 
stated flatly by Judge Juan Ramirez and Professor Amy Ronner, 
“the right to counsel is . . . the core of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.”178 “Any death penalty system that provides 
inadequate counsel and that, at least as a partial result of that 
inadequacy, fails to insure that mental disability evidence is 
adequately considered and contextualized by death penalty 
decision-makers, fails miserably from a therapeutic jurisprudence 
perspective.”179 If counsel in death penalty cases fails to meet 
constitutional minima, it strains credulity to argue that such a 
practice might comport with TJ principles. TJ is the perfect 
mechanism “to expose [the law’s] pretextuality”180 because this 
pretextuality is clear in the death penalty context. 
In short, our entire capital punishment system mocks those 
principles of TJ that we must embrace if we are to have a coherent 
and legitimate criminal procedure system. 
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XII. Conclusion  
The picture painted in this Article is fairly gloomy. I remain, 
however, an optimist and hope that one of the most egregious of 
cases, the McCollum case,181 may signal a turn-around. There are 
still many who adhere to the magical thinking that authentically 
innocent individuals cannot be convicted, and certainly not in a 
death penalty case, when there are allegedly so many additional 
constitutional protections available to defendants—what used to 
be called (and the phrase sounds faintly atavistic now) super due 
process.182 
Although the Innocence Project has done a heroic, almost 
other-worldly, job in putting the lie to this bromide,183 their work 
has not yet significantly shifted public attitudes, especially in the 
death belt. But it is possible—again, I remain an optimist after all 
these years—that McCollum (about whom there was never any 
doubt as to guilt in any judge’s mind; indeed, even Justice 
Blackmun assumed that he was)184 will serve the same “shock the 
conscience” role that the Birmingham church bombings, the 
Triangle shirtwaist factory fire, and the Willowbrook exposures did 
in other areas of social policy.185 At least, I hope that it does.  
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Certainly, if we incorporate a mode of therapeutic 
jurisprudential analysis, that will make ameliorative change more 
likely. If TJ principles are applied to questions that revolve around 
adequacy of counsel, and the use of medication so as to make 
defendants “competent to be executed,” then we will have taken 
major steps towards bringing about this change.186 I have written 
often about how TJ is the best possible tool to “expose pretextuality 
and strip bare the law’s sanist facade” in other areas of the law;187 
I believe that this is just as so in the context of the death penalty.188 
But until then, we are faced with the reality that prosecutors in 
the cohort of cases that I discuss here violate the law and the codes 
of ethics with impunity, and are often rewarded for it, which is a 
state of affairs about as contrary to the principles of TJ as one can 
imagine.  
Although the legacy of the Giarratano case is still uncertain at 
best, I can certainly say with confidence that mental disability 
makes the whole notion of meaningful post-conviction review for 
the death penalty defendant utterly pretextual, especially in the 
cases of defendants who have no counsel and proceed pro se.189 
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Again, I believe this all starts at the doorstep of the prosecutor and 
of the judge who closes his or her eyes and ears to the stench of 
prosecutorial misconduct. The narrator of Changing of the Guards, 
the Dylan song that inspired my title, says, in the stanza in 
question, “I stepped forth from the shadows.”190 Prosecutors who 
misbehave in death penalty cases involving defendants with 
mental disabilities and the judges who sanction that behavior 
have, traditionally, stayed in the “shadows.” I hope this article, to 
some extent, helps bring them out.  
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